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ABSTRACT 
This paper identiies the type of incidence of the Supreme Audit Insti-
tutions on the phenomenon of corruption, through statistical analysis 
for a sample of 78 countries. Statistical methodology for panel data 
is used. The results demonstrate that is statistical evidence of positive 
effects. Fixed effects across countries are different, which demonstrate 
that there are, for each unit of study differential effects of control on 
corruption. It cannot be interpreted the degree of impact, nonetheless 
the results are robust and signiicant. 
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INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with the incidence that Supreme Audit Insti-
tutions has in the corruption phenomenon. Consequently an empiric 
analysis that covers 78 countries will be performed, based in statistic 
methodology for panel data. Variables of the International Budget 
Partnership (IBP), Transparency International (TI), World Bank (WB) and 
World Economic Forum (WEF) are used. 
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We argue that the strength of the Supreme Audit Institutions has a 
positive impact in reducing corruption however; it is likely that the de-
gree of impact differ among countries. The Open Budget Index Sub-
score for the SAI Strength (SAls index) is used to measure the level of 
strength of the Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI); we used other sources 
(TI, WB, WEF) to gather information that measure the perception of cor-
ruption in different countries. 
The irst section of the paper briely reviews the purposes the Supreme 
Audit Institutions, as well as the characteristic elements of strength of 
the SAI that are considered to measure this aspect in the SAIs index. 
The second section offers some conceptual and theoretical elements 
of the corruption phenomenon; these elements are linked to the group 
of variables that are the independent variables in the statistic model. 
Subsequently the statistical elements of the methodology for data pan-
el are observed briely. The last section describes the models applied, 
and reports the statistic results that prove the degree of incidence that 
Supreme Audit Institutions have in the corruption phenomenon for the 
78 countries; as well, conclusions are presented.
I. SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTIONS 
Most countries, no matter the level of development, have external 
control structures and systems that monitor government action. The 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) constitute the main accountability in-
strument. Furthermore, the SAIs in many cases are used to prevent cor-
ruption. 
The literature on SAIs has traditionally categorize the basic models in 
three types: a. - Westminster, b. - Judicial or Napoleonic, and c. - com-
mittee or council.1 The Supreme Audit Institution is a control element 
that legislatures or parliaments exert on the so-called government ac-
tion that is exercised within the executive branch. Gutierrez and Puente 
(2015, p.393) indicates that the “legislators then have the discretion as 
regards parliamentary control over the federal civil service”. 
In order to supervise the executive, legislatures have to their dispos-
al many different tools and the most common are the hearing com-
mittees, hearings in plenary sessions, investigation committees, ques-
tions, interpellations, ombudsman, the government auditing of public 
accounts, committees (in general) and public accounts committees 
(Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004, p.4). The audit tools mentioned are set 
in two different dimensions: opportunity of audit activity (ex ante or ex 
post) and if the activity is internal or external to the legislature. How-
ever, within academia it has noted that the presence of audit tools is 
1 See OECD Good Practices for Support Audit Institutions (SAI), 2012, pp. 15-21.
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a necessary condition but not suficient for effective 
control (Pelizzo, 2009, p.27).
Sartori (1992) mentioned, “an effective auditing de-
pends on the parliament capacity or potential to reg-
ulate government activities”. According to, INTOSAI,2 
it has considered that auditing must have a positive 
effect on society’s conidence in public institutions, 
position in which guarantors of public funds might act 
differently if they knew they could be inspected. This 
would take to adopt values of accountability and 
a better performance within government. Supreme 
Audit Institutions supports the parliamentary function 
of auditing public expenses of government; this ac-
tion is overseeing what is commonly called Supreme 
Audit and may have different purposes and be used 
for:
a) Accountability; 
b) A type of external control of the auditees;
c)  Improving governance considering the ad-
ministrative aspects;
d) Evaluate the use of public resources;
e)  Verify the eficiency of governance action, 
through policies and public programs im-
plementation;
f) Verify compliance with law;
g) Prevent corruption.
I.1. ELEMENTS OF STRENGHT OF SUPREM 
AUDIT 
In this study, we identify the Supreme Audit Institutions 
strength based in three characteristic elements:
2 International Orga-
nization of Supreme 
Audit Institutions.
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I. Supreme Audit Institutions independence,
II. Institutional capacity, and
III. Usefulness of information. 
The SAI independence allows supervision with-
out political pressures and contains conlicts of in-
terest. Therefore, this value gives a greater dose of 
eficiency and effectiveness of the control action.3 
Institutional capacities refers to legal and technical 
characteristic that SIAs must have and adopt for the 
proper exercise of the audit function, ie, the sum of 
legal capacities by mandate and technical capac-
ities for good implementation of the supervisory ac-
tion. The third element corresponds to the usefulness 
of information, analyzes the timing of audit reports, 
reviewing reports by the legislature, and reports of 
the recommendations adopted.
The characteristic strength elements of the Supreme 
Audit Institutions are measured in the SIAs index built 
by the International Budget Partnership (IBP), and it 
is the explanatory variable to our empirical analysis.
II. CONCEPTUAL REVIEW AND 
THEORY OF CORRUPTION
In the last decades, the concept of corruption is of-
ten associated to Public Administration. The accounts 
have their foundation in the government system, it 
can be related with the holder of these procedures 
as the “public oficial”, as the key igure. Neverthe-
less, corrupt behavior also invade private sphere, in-
troduces among private organizations, seeking mu-
tual agreements to inluence markets and business 
decisions, and interacts with public organizations.
In an act of corruption (whose concept for 
Rose-Ackerman approaches to the concept of “pu-
trefaction”), involves two actors who are in charge 
of the operation, the corruptor and the corrupted. 
As it is mentioned by Sánchez González (2012, p.53) 
“one performs the task and the other requests the 
3 This is provided 
within the frame-
work of Professional 
Standards INTOSAI 
Lima Declaration 
particularly marked 
in 1977 and the Mex-
ico Declaration on 
SAI Independence 
2006.
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service, which is equivalent to a remuneration be-
tween them”.
Corruption has its legal implication, when public of-
icials abuse their power, and it is relected in several 
instances, those generated within the bureaucrat-
ic structures of a low proile and on the other hand, 
the one associated to systematic corruption in which 
bureaucratic hierarchy is involved (Rose-Ackerman 
2011, pp.21-23). The literature highlight that corrup-
tion is a generalized, cross-border and own evil of the 
contemporary world, that combines global, nation-
al and local, a pandemic inside government areas, 
where resources are illegally transformed into private 
proits.4
The above is conirmed in several studies and analy-
sis about corruption. Some of them with an economic 
perspective, both theoretical and applied, that it is 
regularly focus on the operation of Public Adminis-
trations, where characteristic acts of corruption are 
made. These studies focus their attention on estimat-
ing the expenses generated by acts of corruption in 
economic activity and identify the loss of eficiency 
and effectiveness inside the economic system as a 
whole. In addition, several recent studies have been 
presented, about the corruption phenomena in the 
private sector, like public corruption incurs high costs 
for economic activity and increasingly permeating 
most in the markets (Alonso y Garcimartín, 2011).
Further empiric studies, have revealed that presi-
dential systems are generally more corrupt than par-
liamentary democracies; and proportional represen-
tation systems are more corrupt than relative majority 
systems. The more vulnerable systems are those who 
combine strong presidencies with proportional rep-
resentation, where a powerful executive negotiates 
with a group of powerful party leaders to share pow-
er privileges. Likewise, is has been evidence that fed-
eral system countries tend to be more corrupt than 
those with a centralist system (Rose-Ackerman, 2011, 
pp.25-33). 
Furthermore, studies ind a strong positive correla-
tion between federalism and corruption, other ind 
4 Among those who 
ind Diego Bautista 
(2006), Pozas Hor-
casitas (2009), Alon-
so and Garcimartín 
(2011) and Sánchez 
González (2013).
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a strong negative correlation between iscal decen-
tralization spending and corruption, even this result is 
conditioned with the decentralization of tax collec-
tion.5
Del Castillo and recently Sánchez González (2012, 
pp.70-74), identify three types of corruption:
1. Political corruption 
2. Administrative corruption 
3. Judicial corruption 
Political corruption occurs when politicians divert 
public funds, extort individuals and companies to ob-
tain incomes, take bribes and buy votes in elections. 
Political corruption undermines the core of democra-
cy by buying public decisions. This type of corruption 
it is also called “governmental crime”.
According to Transparency International (2000, p.6), 
we can ind two distinct categories of administrative 
corruption. The irst occurs when services or contracts 
“in accordance with the rules” are awarded, and the 
second when transactions are “against the rules”; in 
the irst case, the public oficial receives an illegal pri-
vate beneit for doing what corresponds according 
to their functions and in the second circumstances, 
the public oficial extorts and gets a bribe to grant 
improper service.
The third type of corruption takes place in a judicial 
branch. Judicial corruption refers to buy and sell jus-
tice to the highest bidder; this act generates effects 
and negative impacts to the Rule of Law. It is consid-
ered that judges hold unlawfully near-monopoly of 
judicial power, but also have great discretion of their 
functions,6 strong incentives that are related even 
with the practice of inluence peddling. 
Heidenhammer (p.176) references that corruption 
can refer to three principal domains:7
i. a legal domain (as a crime or offence by a 
public oficial),
5 Within these types 
of studies that try to 
explain the causal 
relationship feder-
a l i sm-cor rupt ion, 
we can mention 
Treisma, D. (2000), 
The causes of cor-
ruption: a cross na-
tional study, Journal 
of Public Econom-
ics, vol. 76, pp 399-
457 and Fisman R., 
and R. Gatti (1999), 
Decent ra l i za t ion 
and corruption: 
cross-country and 
cross-state evi-
dence, World Bank.
6 A proper review of 
the phenomenon of 
judicial corruption 
see: Malem Seña, 
J.F., corruption in 
the judiciary, in: M. 
Carbonell and R. 
Vázquez (coordi-
nators), Power, law 
and corruption, p. 
174.
7 See in Cardenas, 
J., and M. Mijan-
gos, about the the-
oretical framework 
of corruption, legal 
studies in honor of 
Martha Morineau. 
Contemporary legal 
systems. Compar-
ative law. Various 
topics, Mexico, Le-
gal Research Insti-
tute-UNAM p. 176, 
2006.
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ii. a market domain (corruption as an eco-
nomic decision taken by a 
public oficial) and;
iii. a political domain (corruption and subver-
sion of public interest by personal interests).
 
Schacter and Shah (2004) enumerate three types of 
corruption:
a) bureaucratic or minor corruption, where a 
wide number of public oficials abuse of their 
public ofice to frequently ask for small favors 
or bribes.
b) larger corruption, that implies a robbery or 
abuse of a larger amount of public funds to a 
relatively small oficials number. 
c) state or regulatory capture, which occurs 
when there is collusion between public and 
private agents in order to increase the private 
beneits, through manipulation of creation 
processes and law implementations, regula-
tions and public policies to be unfairly favored, 
normally, excluding competitors. 
The concept of “State capture” is linked to the char-
acterization of what some authors called economic 
corruption, where the State is used to beneit some 
business sectors through the process of elaboration 
of political and economic reforms, and the regulat-
ing creation of speciic markets.8
A control analysis of corruption has been devel-
oped  in economic theory, through the “model of 
principal-agent” (also called agency theory), here 
includes the Robert Klitgaard (1998, pp.3-5) contri-
bution, that analyze the conditions that generate in-
centives for individual’s corrupt behavior (agent-prin-
cipal), considers a system by the following equation: 
C = M + D – A
Corruption equals monopoly power (M), plus discre-
tion (D), minus accountability (A). The ight against 
8 Oscar Ugarteche 
(2011) illustrates some 
cases of state cap-
ture in countries like 
Perú, where he de-
scribes the privat-
ization of the airline 
AeroPerú area and its 
assault mechanism on 
the institutions to ben-
eit a speciic private 
group.
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corruption, therefore, starts with better systems. In this 
way, the smaller the group of actors who take deci-
sions on the matter in question (monopoly), the great-
er the margin of discretion of such actors to make 
decisions and, inally, the fewer controls on agents 
who take decisions are, there will always be greater 
possibilities for corruption to arise. 
According to the agency theory, the problems of 
the relationship between “agent and principal”9 are 
concentrated in two areas. On the one hand, it is rare 
that “principal-agent” share exactly the same inter-
ests. Normally their interests are divergent, which be-
comes an incentive for the “agent” to act in defense 
of their interests before doing so in defense of the 
“principal”. On the other hand, the “principal” rarely 
has a perfect and full information of the “agent” per-
formance. That is often an asymmetry of information 
between “principal-agent” occurs. These situations 
provide opportunities for the “agent” decided to act 
against the demands and interests of the “principal”.
For Martinez-Cousinou and Andersson (2009, pp.1-
2), the problem of information asymmetry is an ob-
stacle to the effective control of the “agent” by the 
“main” emerging problem of monitoring, which in 
turn creates incentives for political corruption out-
break.
Furthermore, the “structural corruption approach” 
proposed by Sandoval– Ballesteros (2013, pp.9-23), 
describes the speciic form of social dominance 
characterized by abuse of power, simulation and 
misappropriation of resources, as a result of a sharp 
difference in the structural power. Structural equation 
where corruption is equal to the abuse of power (AP), 
plus impunity (I), minus citizen participation (CP): 
C = AP + I – CP.
Emphasizes three elements are important: a) the 
abuse of public power by creating a situation of 
domination, b) the lack of punishment and impu-
nity for private and public actors who perform acts 
of corruption, and c) the loss of power citizen who 
relects a rift with the political class. These elements 
9 In the “agency 
theory” we would 
have to place cit-
izens as the Princi-
pal, who delegate 
the implementation 
of its interests in an 
Agent, the presi-
dent, who acts on 
behalf of the Prin-
cipal. Both actors 
are self- interested 
and act rationally 
according to their 
preferences, which 
are different and 
sometimes opposite.
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lead to the conclusion that a double structural fraud 
appears in society in electoral-political and inancial 
aspects” (Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2013).
Therefore, in a situation of structural corruption, the 
State is required to take special measures to disrupt 
the operation of the power groups underlying struc-
tural corruption. The consequences are intertwined 
between impunity and lack of fair trial. Generally are 
closely linked to discrimination and constitute an ob-
stacle to human rights of individuals, either because 
it diverts public resources that could be devoted to 
the recognition and guarantee of rights, or because 
it imposes additional requirements such as bribery or 
extortion.
Furthermore, transparency and access to public in-
formation, is an element that aids prevent corruption, 
to reduce the problems of asymmetric information 
and, therefore, allows better monitoring politicians 
and public oficials. Concealment of public informa-
tion in order to favor private interests over the public 
interests is a form to corrupt what is called the “public 
space”.10 The importance of access to public infor-
mation, conceives the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, as a transversal tool to combat 
the phenomenon of corruption.11
III. IMPACT OF STRENGHT OF 
SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTIONS IN 
CORRUPTION
This section presents a statistical model that provides 
information about the degree of impact that the 
strength of the Supreme Audit Institutions has on the 
perception of corruption. Our hypothesis is that the 
strength of the Supreme Audit Institutions has a posi-
tive impact in reducing the perception of corruption, 
same to be explained by statistical analysis method 
for data panel. 
10 The concept of 
“recognition of pub-
lic space” is raised 
by Mauricio Merino, 
as an ethical value 
that should be con-
sidered in public 
policies of transpar-
ency, among which 
are the “principle 
of kantian advertis-
ing, the principle of 
greater social efi-
ciency and the val-
ue refers to the ethic 
of responsibility of 
public oficials” see 
Merino, M., trans-
parency and public 
Policy at: Ackerman, 
JM (Coord.) Beyond 
access to informa-
tion: Transparency, 
accountability and 
rule of law, pp. 240-
262.
11 Art.10. United 
Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, 
ONU 2013.
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A. STATISTIC ANALYSIS METHOD 
The statistical analysis is formalized by applying the 
method for data panel models. The speciications 
and the general framework of these models are pre-
sented and the assumptions required for validation 
and allow us to identify the statistical weight of the 
respective explanatory variable on the dependent 
variable are set.12
A regression model with data panel includes a data 
sample of agents of interest (individuals, companies, 
organizations and countries) along the time; there is 
no limit to the heterogeneity of these social agents, 
by allowing the existence of individual speciic vari-
ables and temporary effects. It combines data types 
with temporal and structural dimension.
The classic regression model, considers the exam-
ple in which it is a linear function of K are explicative 
variables where k = 1, 2,3,…, K:
(1) 
In this analysis, i = 1, … N social units (78 coun-
tries) and t = 1, ... T observations in time (4 years 
accounted biannually, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 
2012).
ǃ is a vector of parameters K
X is the i- th observation at time t for the ex-
planatory K
The total sample observation models is given to 
specify the set of N*T (312) observations. Besides the 
u_it is the error term that represents the effects of all 
other variables omitted from the model, ie it is the 
variation observed in the k independent variables.
There are assumptions that allow us to estimate the 
panel by ordinary least squares (OLS) as the classic 
regression model-standard. These assumptions are 
based on the premise that the term of error follows 
a normal distribution with zero mean and constant 
variance, the hypothesis says that the variable in the 
12 A must for math-
ematics and statis-
tics speciications 
can be found at: 
Greene, W.H. (2006) 
Chapter 14, D. N. Gu-
jarati (2004) Chapter 
16 and Wooldridge 
(2010).
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variance of the error term is the same for each of the 
observations (homoscedasticity assumption).13
Besides in these error terms are not related for differ-
ent time lapses, neither are they correlated for differ-
ent studies units. In order to fulill these conditions, we 
can assure that the resulting stimulators by the stimu-
lation method are reliable and consistent to carry out 
indifference statistics.
It is common to interpret data models panel through 
its error components. The term u_it error listed in the 
equation (1) can be decomposed as follows:
(2) 
In which:
ǂ_i represents unobservable effects differ among 
units of study, but not in time. Identiies Ǆ_i un-
quantiiable effects that vary over time, but not 
between the study units. 
w_i refers only to a random error term. 
The joint analysis of N*T observations can present 
correlation in the error terms in different ways so 
they must comply with the assumptions of ho-
moscedasticity and no serial correlation.
From the general model (1), and according to 
Johnston and DiNardo (1997) we can order vari-
ous types of speciications in a taxonomy on pan-
el data models, however, three of them are the 
most traditionally used. 
I. - panel models with constant coeficients     
(3) 
It is assumed that the coeficients of K parame-
ters are the same for each of the study units in the 
sample, and also that are constant over time.
II. - models ixed effects panels 
(4) 
Captures the variation in the sample due to 
the presence of different units of study with the 
inclusion of a set of dichotomous variables di. 
It is assumed that the coeficients (constant or 
13 It is used to make 
the necessary es-
timates statistical 
software E-Views 9 
which automatically 
incorporates several 
methods of estima-
tion and for better 
speciication of the 
models used.
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independent term model) vary depending on 
the unit of study or moment in time.
III. - model random effect panels
(5) 
Where u_it mistake has the structure of equa-
tion (2).14
Individual coeficients α_i and / or temporary _t coef-
icients are no longer ixed effects regression constant 
term but are allowed to vary randomly over time and 
through study units. It is assumed that the variation 
across the study units (and / or over time) is random 
and therefore is captured and explicitly speciied in 
the error term.
B. ANALYSIS VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
The explanatory variable that represents the strength 
of the supreme audit institutions, is the one built by the 
International Budget Partnership (IBP)15 through Meth-
odology of the Open Budget Survey, which measures 
the budget transparency, participation and surveil-
lance in countries around the world. In order to allow 
comparisons between different countries and at dif-
ferent times, through the results of the survey based 
on a questionnaire of 125 questions.
The International Budget Partnership (2012, pp.2-
6) through the survey, has estimated the Open Bud-
get Index (OBI) based on a simple average of the 
responses to 95 survey questions related to budget 
transparency. This index assigns a score ranging from 
0 to 100. The Open Budget Survey also includes a sec-
tion that assesses the opportunities for public partici-
pation in the budget process, the monitoring capac-
ity of legislatures and the strength of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (SAI);16 in relation to this last section of the 
survey, we focus on the results of SAIs index.
The IBP builds the SAI_OBI index by applying sur-
veys through a collaborative process in which the IBP 
14 OLS method is not 
applicable because 
the assumptions that 
allow consistent esti-
mator are not met. 
So it is preferable 
in this case use the 
method of gener-
alized least squares 
(GLS) whose esti-
mates are higher 
than the OLS, if not 
met the traditional 
assumptions.
15 International Bud-
get Partnership.- www.
internationalbudget.
org.
16 The element of 
“assessment of pub-
lic participation in 
the budget pro-
cess” is new from 
the survey for 2012, 
which measures the 
presence of citizens 
throughout the bud-
geting process.
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works with civil society partners in 100 countries,17 so 
as to be representative in different regions and for 
different income levels.18 The survey is made in a bi-
annual base, and has included the 2006, 2008, 2010 
and 2012 cycles. By 2012 the IBP to measure the SAIs 
index made some adjustments for the methodology, 
however, in our investigation process, the homologa-
tion was conducted to integrate the index based in 
previous years. The information for the construction 
of SIAs, contemplates the three main elements of 
strength of the Supreme Audit Institutions mentioned 
above.
The SAIs index reveal that for 2012 an average 
score of 69 to 100, ie, most of the countries surveyed 
was working relatively well in terms of strength on 
their SAIs. The IBP demonstrate a classiication that in-
cludes three categories to identify the degree of SIAs 
among the countries, weak, moderate and strong. 
In table 1, we can identify those who got values ac-
cording to our selected sample of 78 countries.
The report of the IBP of the Open Budget Survey for 
2012 exhibits the results on the strength of SAIs and 
reveals that audit entities are strong in countries that 
belong to each of the different categories on differ-
ent legal systems (British, French, German, Scandina-
vian and Socialist). There are no evidence (based on 
the mix of countries with high scores), that the consti-
tutional system of a country determines the strength 
of Supreme Audit Institutions.
17 According to IBP, 
the results of the 
survey for the 2012 
edition are based 
on the questionnaire 
of 125 questions a 
complete group of 
researchers within 
an organization in 
the country. Most 
researchers respon-
sible for completing 
the questionnaire 
belong to academic 
institutions or civil so-
ciety organizations.
18 It is important to 
state that, according 
to information from 
the IBP for the pro-
cess in 2012, 95 gov-
ernments contact-
ed, only 41 agreed 
to send comments 
on the results of the 
Survey on his coun-
try, despite efforts 
to encourage gov-
ernments to provide 
comments, it was 
not possible to ob-
tain greater partici-
pation; this prove an 
indifference in most 
countries in partici-
pating in these exer-
cises transparency, 
considering it a val-
ue yet unadopted. 
Information concern-
ing the methodology 
and guidelines for 
answering questions 
can be found at: 
http://international-
budget.org/what-
we-do/open-bud-
g e t - s u r v e y /
research-resources/
gu ides -ques t ion-
naires/ and to con-
sult the relevant 
comments of gov-
ernments: 
h t t p : / / i n t e r n a -
t i o n a l b u d g e t .
org/what-we-do/
open-budget-sur-
vey/country-info/.
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TABLE 1. STRENGTH OF SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTIONS (2012)
Strenght
Number of 
countries
Countries
Strong (Index value 
67-100)
25
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bostwana, 
Brazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, France, 
Georgia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zeland, Worway, Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Sweden, United King-
dom, United States, Vietnam.
Moderate (Index 
value 34-66)
36
Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, China, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemal, Honduras, Italy, Kazakh-
stan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia, 
Mall, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thai-
land, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, 
Venezuela.
Weak (Index value 
0-33)
17
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, Chad, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, 
Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Turkey, Zambia.
Source: International Budget Partnership
The SAIs index is used as an independent variable to explain the de-
gree and type impact that it has on reducing the perception of cor-
ruption, therefore is required the use of independent variables in the 
respective analysis. Same that has been selected, given the statistical 
robustness in their integration and progressing. 
In table 2, the variables to be explained based on the SAIs index are 
detailed, as the type of expected impact accordingly to our hypoth-
esis. They are grouped by measuring type that is attended to be ad-
dressed. The table describe the six variables that measure the corrup-
tion perception level; these are variables from the WEF, TI and WB. The 
relevant variable is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CIP) of Transpar-
ency International. 
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TABLE 2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CORRUPTION) PERCEPTION)
No. Variable Description Measuring
Expected 
impact
Source
1
D of 
Pfounds
Diversion of public 
funds
corruption 
perception
Positive WEF
2 Pt in P
Public trust in politi-
cians
corruption 
perception
Positive WEF
3 F in DGO
Favoritism in decisions 
of government oficials
corruption 
perception
Positive WEF
4 T of GP
Transparency of gov-
ernment policymaking
corruption 
perception
Positive WEF
5 CPI
Corruption percep-
tions index
corruption 
perception
Positive
IBP - Transpar-
ency Interna-
tional (TI)
6
WBGI_
CORR
Control for corruption
corruption 
perception
Positive WB
Source: WEF.- http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2014- 
2015; IBP-WB.- http://survey.internationalbudget.org/#download.
C. CORRUPTION PERCEPTION (CIP)
The relevant variable analysis is given by the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CIP) Transparency International (TI). The index is presented in a 
scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very transparent). The CIP classiies 
countries according to the level of corruption perceived in public sec-
tor. It is a composite index, a combination of surveys. The data about 
corruption is obtained from various surveys applies to experts and com-
panies conducted by several independent prestigious companies. The 
index relects opinions around the world, including those experts who 
live and work in the evaluated countries. 
The CIP focuses in public sector corruption, ie, the one that involves 
public oficials, public employees and politicians. The surveys used to 
elaborate index include questions about abuse of public power and 
speciically related to public oficials bribery, bribes in public procure-
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ment, misappropriation of public funds and other 
questions that probe the strength and effectiveness 
of anti-corruption initiatives in the public sector. Thus, 
it addresses the administrative and political aspects 
of corruption.19
Therefore, we take the CIP as an index that eval-
uates the perception of political and administrative 
corruption for the sample of countries used corre-
sponding to 78, of which in 2012 only 14 countries 
have achieved a rating greater than 5, the rest can 
be considered that perception is still negative (see 
table 3). 
19 For further refer-
ence on the method-
ology of integration 
Perceptions Index 
by Transparency In-
ternational, we rec-
ommend visiting the 
following website:
http://www.trans-
p a r e n c y . o r g /
c p i 2 0 1 4 / i n _ d e -
tail#top.
TABLE 3. CORRUPTION PERCEPTION FROM 78 COUNTRIES (2012)
Kind of perception of corruption Countries
Positive (CPI between 5 to 10)
Botswana, France, Germany, New Zea-
land , Norway, Poland, Rwanda, Slove-
nia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States
Positive
(CPI between 0-4.9)
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Macedonia, Malawi, Malasya, 
Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morroco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicara-
gua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slo-
vakia South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, 
Uganda, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, 
Zambia
Source: Based on data of Transparency International.
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Other variables that approximate measure the level 
of perceived corruption, are also used in this work. 
Sources of information and methodology for integrat-
ing indexes are desegregated into speciic topics, for 
those with sources WEF have indexes that measure 
the diversion of public resources, public trust in pol-
iticians, favoritism in government oficials decisions, 
and transparency in government policies20 and for 
variable information originates with WB measures the 
control of corruption.
IV. RESULTS OF DEGREE STATISTI-
CAL ANALYSIS AND INCIDENCE 
OF SAIS
In this section statistics speciications are presented 
based on the methodology for data panel models, 
those derived the strengths of SAIs audit impact posi-
tively on the reducing corruption. It is noteworthy that 
the sample selected countries, is based on those who 
could be identiied with information on each variable 
to explain and explanatory. The tests required for 
panel data models to ind the best it speciication 
and can explain the relationship between the vari-
ables in analysis will be conducted.
Some tests were made to see if equality are present-
ed in mean and variance in each of the variables for 
the countries studied, and the transformations that 
some variables are logarithmic type (see Annex 3) 
were performed; the different test results showed that 
the equal status in mean and variance are rejected 
in all cases, this allows us to explain in the irst instance, 
the dependent variables respond to different effects 
in each of the countries. This statistic condition allows 
us to propose speciications based on the method of 
data panel models.
The set of estimated models vary in their speciica-
tion in original level, semi- logarithmic and logarith-
mic. In annexes 2, the descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables used in the empirical analysis are presented.
20. For indexes with 
information pro-
vided by the WEF, 
it is the answer to 
a question where 
opinions of business 
leaders worldwide 
on different themes, 
among which, level 
of corruption, de-
gree of competitive-
ness, being collect-
ed other economic 
aspects.
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IV.1. SAIS IMPACT-CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTION 
In table 4, the results of the estimates for variables 
that measure and represent the level of perceived 
corruption for countries of the sample analysis can be 
observed. 
The results prove that in general, the SAIs index im-
pact positively in a group of variables that are close 
to measure the level of perceived corruption. Partic-
ularly, the relevant variable in this group is deined by 
Transparency International; this index is represented 
by a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very transpar-
ent), which allow us to accept in a statistical and the-
oretical way the approach through the strengths of 
the SAIs impacts in a positive in reducing perception 
of corruption. In which, by giving greater power to 
the Supreme Audit Institutions, that relects capacity 
and autonomy to impose and enforce sanctions, re-
duce the perception of corruption in public sector. 
TABLE 4. DATA PANEL MODELS (CORRUPTION PERCEPTION)
No Variable Model Constant
Coeficient
SAI
R2 DW
Cross-
section
1 CPI
Fixed 
effects 
methods
1.1492
(0.0000)
0.0262
(0.0000)
0.9561 1.99 78
2 T of GP
Fixed 
effects 
methods
1.1127
(0.0000)
0.0716
(0.0108)
0.7629 2.03 78
3 Pt in P
Fixed 
effects 
methods
1.5641
(0.0000)
0.0886
(0.0116)
0.8557 2.05 78
4
WBGI_
CORR
Fixed 
effects 
methods
1.2304
(0.0000)
0.0011
(0.2615)
0.9853 1.95 78
5
D of 
Pfounds
Fixed 
effects 
methods
1.2401
(0.0000)
-0.0223
(0.4398)
0.9021 2.19 78
6
F in 
DGO
Fixed 
effects 
methods
1.8579
(0.0000)
0.00237
(0.5059)
0.7594 1.97 78
Source: own estimates with data from WEF, IBP, WB –TI
Note: the estimation method for robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation pan-
el was used.
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As can be seen in table 4, the irst line refers to the 
CIP demonstrate appropriate statistical speciication, 
where the coeficient for the SAIs is positive and sig-
niicant to level trust of at least 99%,21 even though 
coeficient value is small and hard to interpret, we 
can ind a positive and direct relation between both 
variables. This means, to a greater strength in the su-
preme audit, the corruption inside the public sector 
tends to be reduced. 
The ixed effects model meets the statistical as-
sumptions for validity, therefore, the explanatory vari-
able (SAIs) is a good approximation to explain the 
variability of CIP. Appropriate given the result of the 
statistical R2 it is obtained.
In the data panel models, we observed if regression 
coeficients are different to each study unit, (in this 
case we are talking about the 78 countries analyzed) 
or vary in time, it is assumed that the coeficients 
(constant model) vary depending in study units or 
moment in time.
The “constant” variables that table 4 collects rep-
resent the average of the coeficients of the dichot-
omous variables (di) in each country, which in the 
model represents ixed effects; therefore, the inde-
pendent parameter is modeled, relects heteroge-
neity among them and non-speciic observable fac-
tors for each country, which make their behavior to 
be different from other countries.22 Estimation of ixed 
or individual effects (country effects), explain us that 
are different for each country, ie, the explanatory 
variable rate determined by SAIs index impacts in 
different ways for each country.23
As can be observed in igure 1, reveal that the ex-
planatory variable impacts more in countries like New 
Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Germany, United King-
dom and United States. Countries with less impact in 
the SIAs corruption index variable is Chad, Venezue-
la, Kyrgyz Republic, Kenya, Cambodia, Pakistan, Rus-
sia and Senegal; in a better situation based on the 
latter countries we ind Mexico (41).
21 In this paper, we 
have considered 
that the coeficients 
resulting from the 
explanatory vari-
able and constant 
of each of the pro-
posed models are 
signiicant at a con-
idence level of 99, 
95 and 90 percent 
following a statistical 
t -Student.
22 To ind the ixed 
effects, the value 
of each coeficient 
of the dichotomous 
variables (di) by 
country the value of 
the constant term is 
subtracted. In this 
research, as men-
tioned the E-views 
software is used 
for this type of esti-
mates.
23 To reach this con-
clusion, the statistical 
test was performed 
to test whether the 
ixed effects of each 
country may or may 
not be considered 
equal, for this we 
use the “maximum 
likelihood test for 
the redundancy of 
the ixed effects”. 
Based on a proba-
bility of Chi -square 
(χ2) less than p -val-
ue < 0.05. Therefore, 
we can say that the 
model of ixed ef-
fects panel provides 
consistent result (see 
Annex 3).
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FIGURE 1. FIXED CROSSING EFFECTS (CIP - SAIS)
This result would lead us to make a thorough analysis of the legal and 
consensual requirements established in each country to know the dif-
ferent types of effects and impact of public programs intended at miti-
gating problems of corruption. Same that is outside the scope the study 
and that is proposed as one of the challenges to consider in future 
approaches.
In the second row of Table 4, the results for the variable T of GP, the 
coeficient of SIAs index demonstrate a direct positive relationship to 
levels of transparency and access to government information. The in-
dicator represent the level of transparency in government policies. We 
can infer that the greater strength in the audit is a positive effect in the 
ield of government transparency. 
This is conirmed by the results of the statistical speciication to deter-
mine the type of inluence of SIAs on the variable Pt in P representing 
the level of ethics and public trust in politicians, the estimated positive 
coeficient and a level of statistical signiicance at 95 percent. In these 
cases, grant greater autonomy and strength Supreme Audit Institutions, 
improving the perception of government transparency, ethics and trust 
in politicians.
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The ixed effects determine the effects and impacts of SIAs index vari-
ables representing the level of transparency in government policies (T 
of GP) and, ethics and public trust in politicians (Pt in P) are differenti-
ated analysis unit, according to the statistical evidence presented in 
Annex 3.
According to the results for the coeficient of SIAs index as an ex-
planatory variable of the variable representing the level of Control of 
Corruption (WBGI_CORR) determined by the World Bank (WB) and the 
level of Favoritism in decisions of government oficials (F in DGO) are 
positive. Nevertheless, does not meet the acceptable level of statistical 
signiicance; the signs of the coeficients of SIAs index are expected, 
however it is not possible inference about it, not having a consistent 
speciication.
The incidence of SIAs index in the variable representing the diversion 
of public resources (D of P founds), does not show statistical signii-
cance and consistency, resulting coupled with the opposite sign than 
expected. Therefore, for purposes of this paper there is no possibility of 
making inferences about the type of incident that has the SIAs index in 
this line for 78 selected countries.
CONCLUSION 
We can infer that the strength of the Supreme Audit Institutions impact 
in reducing corruption perception in public sector, in which can be 
inferred, the SIAs index improvement the corruption has lessened. This 
can be explained by having Supreme Audit Institutions with greater 
sanctioning powers and legal force to compel compliance with them, 
as well as, the implementation of legal imperatives as results and rec-
ommendations of the audit action. 
However, it is not possible to determine the degree of impact, given 
the magnitude of the estimated statistical coeficients, although hav-
ing the interpretation of the sign of the coeficients, demonstrate the 
type of incident that may represent jointly, for the sample of countries 
analyzed.
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ANNEX 1. COUNTRIES ID
ID Countries ID Countries
1 Albania 40 Mali
2 Algeria 41 Mexico
3 Argentina 42 Mongolia
4 Azerbaijan 43 Moroco
5 Bangladesh 44 Mozambique
6 Bolivia 45 Namibia
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina 46 Nepal
8 Botswana 47 Wew Zealand
9 Brazil 48 Nicaragua
10 Bulgaria 49 Nigeria
11 Burkina Faso 50 Norway
12  Cambodia 51 Pakistan
13 Cameroon 52 Peru
14 Chad 53 Philippines
15 China 54 Poland
16 Colombia 55 Portugal
17 Costa Rica 56 Romania
18 Croatia 57 Russia
19 Czech Republic 58 Rwanda
20 Dominican Republic 59 Senegal
21 Ecuador 60 Serbia
22 Egypt 61 Slovakia
23 El Salvador 62 Slovenia
24 France 63 Soth Africa
25 Georgia 64 South Korea
26 Germany 65 Spain
27 Ghana 66 Sri Lanka
28 Guatemala 67 Sweden
29 Honduras 68 Tanzania
30 India 69 Thailand
31 Indonesia 70 Trinidad and Tobago
32 Italy 71 Turkey
33 Jordan 72 Uganda
34 Kazakhstan 73 Ukraine
35 Kenya 74 United Kingdom
36 Kyrgyz Republic 75 United States
37 Macedonia 76 Venezuela
38 Malawi 77 Vietnam
39 Malasya 78 Zambia
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ANNEX 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (SU-
PREME AUDIT INSTITUTIONS STRENGTH)
SAIs
Mean 51.49272
Median 53.30000
Maximum 100.0000
Minimun 0.000000
Std. Dev. 22.68234
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (CORRUPTION PERCEPTION) 
D_OF_PFO 
UNDS
PT_IN_P F_IN_DGO T_OF_GP CPI WBGI_
CORR
Mean 3.287199 2.572537 2.978490 4.010793 3.789474 -0.173411
Median 3.075945 2.296709 2.832435 4.055529 3.300000 -0.386906
Maximum 6.596183 5.818509 5.967782 6.040287 9.600000 2.431642
Minimum 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 1.600000 -1.345829
Std Dev 1.100935 0.988513 0.833982 0.798057 1.792225 0.838057
Source: own estimates with data from WEF, IBP, WB–TI.
ANNEX 3. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD TEST FOR REDUNDANCY OF FIXED 
EFFECTS
Independent variable: index SAIs
Chi-square (x2) lower than the p-value < 0.05
No
Dependent 
variable
Model Static P-Value Interpretation
1 CPI
Fixed 
effects 
methods
790.78 0.0000
It is observed 
p-values less than 
0.05 which eads us 
to afirm that ixed 
/ individual effects 
are different
2 T of GP
Fixed 
effects 
methods
384.63 0.000
3 Pt in P
Fixed 
effects 
methods
524.14 0.000
Source: own estimates with data from WEF, IBP, WB–TI.
